4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1



661 bands in the Ukraine. At the time of the 'purge' he occupied the highest military post in the Ukraine: that of Officer Commanding the Kiev Military District. The drama in the Ukraine did not end with the execution of Yakir; during the years 1935–7 several thousands of persons occupying important posts in the Red Army and in the Soviet administration were arrested and shot or exiled to concentration camps in Siberia and the North of Russia. This whirlwind of arrests and executions even carried away with it Postyshev and Kossior, the former instruments of 'the Revolution against the peasants'.

• [701 186] In the meantime the last remnants of the national Ukrainian Army, which had flourished in the years 1923–9, disappeared. Units of the Ukrainian Army, based on the system of 'territorial Divisions' in the Red Army, had been quartered in the Ukraine alongside the troops 'of the Union'. The struggle with the peasantry had made it desirable to abolish the territorial system in the Ukraine as well as in other parts of the Union. The Ukrainian units were broken up and distributed to other parts of the country and their place was taken by regiments recruited in Great Russia. After the execution of the staff of the Kiev Command and the senior personnel of many of the Ukrainian regiments, nothing remained of the Ukrainian Army except the names of certain 'Red' regiments which were retained for the sake of form; but the Ukrainian language continued to be used in units where the rank and file were predominantly of Ukrainian origin.

642 Stalin's Constitution of 1936—which evoked such enthusiasm among European Communists and which was even hailed in the capitalist Press of Western countries as a laudable 'return to democratic institutions' in contrast to the dictatorships of Central Europe—was a cynical accompaniment to the slaughter of so many thousands of Party members which was going on at that time within 'the Soviet Paradise'. Stalin's Constitution marked the final abandonment of the theory that the minority nationalities ranked as equal partners with Great Russia within the Soviet Union. The 'union of different states' was now transformed into one integral state (Paragraph 13: 'The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is a unified state'). According to Paragraph 14 all authority on questions relating to international affairs, the declaration of war and the conclusion of peace, the organization of defence and the command of the armed forces, foreign trade, the safety of the state, the management of all banks, all forms of transport, the principles of land distribution, the basis of public instruction, hygiene, and criminal and civil laws, was reposed in the Central Government.

186 Headquarters at Mohylev and with the other national groups which
642 were rapidly making common cause with the Central Rada in
665 their opposition to the extreme measures of the Petrograd Soviet. The Council of Commissars in Petrograd claimed to speak for the whole of the former Russia in its efforts to make peace with the Germans. When the Rada denied this and approached the other non-Russian peoples, the Bolsheviks in Petrograd formally accused the Rada of withdrawing Ukrainian troops from the front, of disarming Bolshevik units in Ukraine and of allowing the Don Cossack forces to retire to their homeland across Ukrainian territory. On December 17, it hypocritically recognized the right of Ukraine to independence but threatened war on the Rada if it did not meet the conditions of the Council of People's Commissars.

At the same time the Bolsheviks in the Kiev Soviet arranged an All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets in the hope of putting pressure on the Rada. The attempt missed fire for the Congress proved to be under the influence of the anti-Bolshevik parties and adopted resolutions declaring that the Ukrainians had not thrown off the power of the Tsar to accept the domination of the Commissars. The Bolshevik spokesman Zatonsky was unable to make himself heard above the opposition and only 80 members supported the Soviet demands.

As a result of this failure Vasili Shakhray and Zatonsky left Kiev for Kharkiv where they joined a Congress of Soviets largely from the Donets basin and Kryvy Rih. There, on December 20, they established a new Ukrainian Rada under Russian Communist control and set up a Ukrainian Soviet Republic. They were joined by a group of Ukrainian Bolsheviks including Neronovych and George Kotsyubynsky, the son of the well-known Ukrainian author who had been a friend of Gorky.

●[701] The so-called Ukrainian army loyal to this new regime was composed almost exclusively of Russian troops and was under the open command of a Russian officer, Michael A. Muravyev. This force occupied Kiev on February 7, 1918 and held the city for about three weeks. Its actions showed clearly the nature of the government. Under the pretext of liberating the Ukrainians from

369 They could also, if they still had preserved any valuables, dispose
511 of them through the Torgsin stores which sold imported wares for foreign currency and precious metals.

[554] Of course, neither in city or village did any of these restrictions apply to the more important Communists who possessed their own stores at which the government supplied them with the necessary articles to allow them to live in comfort and luxury as a welcome investment for the regime. The line of demarcation between the poor and the rich, the ordinary people and the Communists, became steadily greater, until it was often wider than it had been in the old tsarist Russian empire.

642 All these measures which had been adopted in Moscow were
631 in theory supposed to apply to all sections of the USSR equally, but it was not long before the natives of Ukraine realized that however impartial the laws might seem, they were not sufficiently flexible to take account of local and republican differences. The central regime was interested in advancing and developing the Moscow industrial area and it expended on this in various grandiose efforts, as the Moscow subway, enormous sums of money. It is safe to say that the expenditures in that one area alone equalled the entire budget and money spent by the central government in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. It classified Ukraine as one of the regions where the supply of manufactured goods was less necessary.

The crushing of the Ukrainian Communists, the suicide of Khvylovy and Skrypnyk, no less than the complete altering of the land code of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the substitution of the new policy of collectivization, showed perfectly well where the real power of the USSR lay in the thirties and it was accompanied by such acts as the introduction of Russian as the
• [701] standard language of instruction and of the army. This was followed by the formal transfer of the Ukrainian divisions to the Red Army and a number of other acts which completed the subordination of the UkSSR. Already in 1930, during difficulties on the Soviet-Manchuria borders, the Red Army had not hesitated to

1/1 [after 1933 - measures dealing with production, supply etc. - illegible]

668 tried to break this up but they were unsuccessful and the police
725 battalion which was assigned to the operation was destroyed. Out of this Conference developed the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations which adopted as its program, "Freedom to peoples, freedom to the individual."

[701] It would take too long to describe the actual nature of the military operations which the U. P. A. carried on. At the height of its power it controlled more than 200,000 square miles of Ukrainian territory and numbered some 220,000 soldiers divided into four main bands: the U. P. A. North, operating in Polissya and northern Volynia; the U. P. A.—West in Eastern Galicia and Kholmshchyna; the U. P. A. —South in northern Bukovyna and the provinces of Kamyanets Podilsky and Vinnytsya; and the U. P. A.—East north of Kiev and Zhytomyr. There were separate detachments in most of the cities and important towns.

[661] To oppose its operations, the Germans resorted to mass executions and on more than one occasion detached forces of one or two divisions to try to destroy its centres. These attempts failed and the U. P. A. by its constant efforts played an important part in isolating the German forces, upsetting their communications and sapping their strength. All this was very costly, for after every major blow the Germans executed large numbers of innocent Ukrainians as their one weapon against the movement.

At first there was relative peace in Galicia, but in the summer of 1943 a Soviet partisan detachment entered the province. The Germans took little action and the U. P. A. came to the support of the population and soon had established strong centres in the Carpathian Mountains, where the difficult terrain facilitated their maintenance of strong positions.

[127] The Germans in the beginning did not want to admit that their policy toward the Ukrainians had evoked such a strong response. Koch and his associates were only too willing to believe that the Ukrainians were an inferior race, undeserving of education or of consideration and they went out of their way to label the U. P. A. the product of Communist intrigue and a movement of support for the Jews, etc.

433 brothers, the Great Russians, the one people that were loyal through
642 thick and thin to the authorities of the Soviet Union.
727 Yet instead of bringing in an era of peace and harmony, Stalin and his associates, emboldened by their successes in central Europe, immediately began a new campaign against the American "warmongers" and "imperialists" to prepare the people for still more rigid controls. It became clear almost at once that the return of the Soviet authorities was to usher in not a relaxation but a tightening of the old controls.

[668] These were bitterly resented. In Odesa and Kharkiv there were serious disturbances and while there may be some question as to whether these were directly inspired and organized by detachments of the U. P. A., it seems perfectly clear that they were suppressed not only by the forces of the MVD but by the Red Army.

631 On the other hand, as early as 1944 when the Nazi tide began
648 to ebb and the Western Sovietophile feeling was at its height, the Union Council of Commissars in Moscow passed a resolution authorizing the various Soviet Republics to enter into relations with foreign countries by having their own Commissariats for Foreign Affairs and their own national armies. Such devices completely fooled the Allied leaders. They did not notice or want to notice that the Ukrainian Commissar for Foreign Affairs, D. Z. Manuilsky, had long played a role as a Russian Soviet representative in the Ukraine. Furthermore, the new Ukrainian and Byelorussian armies did not adopt the language of the country for which they were fighting. In theory after 1944 they were the only Soviet troops engaged against the Germans but even Stalin and the central authority did not pretend that there were no Great Russians in these armies. On the contrary, they boasted of this fact, whenever it was not necessary to hold before the world the shadow of Ukrainian and Byelorussian independence. The ruse worked and both Ukraine and Byelorussia were admitted to the United Nations, but both countries have declined to enter into diplomatic relations with any foreign country and have chosen, as was natural, to carry on all their negotiations through Moscow. Still later, in 1951, to carry this pretense of independence still further and deceive the

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6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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# VII. SALVAGE EFFORTS

AT THE VERY TIME when partisan activity was reaching its peak in Volhynia, Ukrainian nationalist elements began the last chapter of their collaboration with the Germans. Strange as it may appear, in this final period, cooperation between these disparate forces was closer than during the abortive "honeymoon" of 1941. The key to this apparent paradox lies in the Ukrainian psychology—a better term than attitude in this case—toward the creation of a national military force and in the German policy toward securing the military collaboration of Eastern Europe. 668*

Few political movements in this century have been as thoroughly obsessed as the Ukrainian nationalist movement with the idea of building military strength. This obsession is readily understandable as far as the OUN parties were concerned, for their ideology emphasized will, force, action. While there was a persistent trend in the senior branch of the OUN toward shaping the movement in a military mold with an emphasis on order and discipline, the younger group was inclined to cast aside all inhibitions to secure the immediate application of violence. To both, however, the army—insofar as it represented sheer power—was a high ideal. Non-Nationalist circles, such as the UNR and the legal parties in Galicia, also placed enormous emphasis upon military organization. When one reflects that in 1919–21 the nationalist movement in both the East and the West Ukraine had been bloodily suppressed by superior organized force, the roots of this concern become discernible. During the revolutionary period the lack of a substantial nucleus of trained military units, similar to those of the Poles, the Bolsheviks, and the White Russian forces had been a terrible handicap to the Ukrainian cause. In the Second World War nationalist leaders were willing to exact great material sacrifices of their people in order to overcome this critical lack. 668* 701

The Ukrainian hopes for the formation in 1941 of a military 000

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1



this situation, in which the Ukrainian nationalists were able to maintain their independence of the Vlasov movement, although without being able to gain control of even a majority of the men of Ukrainian ethnic origin in German military service. While there were some efforts, such as a personal meeting between Vlasov and Shandruk, to find a modus vivendi between the two groups, these came to nothing. On the contrary, the Ukrainians went ahead with the setting up of their own national committee. Shandruk became president and the vice-presidents were Volodymyr Kubiiovych and Alexander Semenenko, mayor of Kharkov under the occupation. Thus the "old emigration" (Shandruk was born in Lubny), the West Ukraine, and the Soviet Ukraine were represented.[72] Aside from a certain moderation in German treatment of the Ukrainian *Ostarbeiter*, however, the group was able to accomplish little. In the last weeks of Germany's hopeless struggle the organization was officially recognized and allowed to issue a proclamation in Weimar on March 17, 1945, as the Ukrainian National Committee. The deterioration of German power enabled the Committee to take a strong stand for an independent Ukrainian state, without giving even lip service to alliance with the Germans. However, the document made it clear that the main practical objective was care for the interests of the Ukrainian refugees, workers, and soldiers in Germany.[73]

The proclamation also announced that the Ukrainian soldiers were henceforth to be united in the Ukrainian National Army. Under the circumstances, this could mean little. Nevertheless, in the final days of the war General Shandruk was able to go to the First Division of his forces, and the German general in command formally surrendered his powers to him.[74] Of more practical importance was the fact that Shandruk and other Ukrainian leaders had been able to get in touch with Allied military quarters even before the surrender of the division. While its personnel were of course treated as prisoners of war, their commanders were able to convince the Western authorities that the unit was composed wholly of Galicians. As West Ukrainians, they had thus never

[72] Interviews 9, 22.
[73] From a printed copy furnished me by General Shandruk.
[74] Interview 22, and order by General Freitag already cited.

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1



000 to make the Ukrainian idea one of the principal pivots of German claims.

175 668 701 If, under Austrian direction, one did not dare to speak of separatism to the prisoners, the German general staff, the new master of the Ukrainian movement, thought of the establishment of an independent Ukrainian State, under German control, and gave its propagandists directions in this sense. From 1915 the Little Russians who agreed to declare themselves Ukrainians and not Russians were sent to the camp of Radstadt. In this camp specialists of the Ukrainian question, under the direction of Professor Bezpalko, undertook a series of lectures in which they drew pictures of the independence and liberty of the Cossacks for the benefit of their hearers, appealing to them to reject the 'heinous yoke of Asiatic Muscovy.' Towards the beginning of 1917, that is to say after two years of assiduous work, the German general staff succeeded in recruiting, in the camp, 15,000 prisoners. The regiment of 'Taras Chevtchenko' was created. This regiment consisted of eight companies and had about 1600 men. The soldiers of this regiment, looked upon as undoubted partisans of the independence of the Ukraine under German protection, were armed and equipped in readiness for being used in a possible offensive in South Russian regions. The remainder was divided into four groups:

1. About 1500 men formed the *Sitch* (the name of the ancient Cossack community) and enjoyed the complete confidence of the German authorities with regard to their loyalty to the new Ukrainian cause, without yet being entrusted with arms.

2. The 'apprentices,' about 3000, still considered as not absolutely reliable but already somewhat influenced by the propaganda.

3. The 'candidates,' about 3000, those who were

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neutral or indifferent to the question but without marked hostility.

4. Finally the 'opponents,' about 6000, who, although they had agreed to take the name of 'Ukrainians,' were actively opposed to separatist propaganda. They were continually sent to penal work and had to undergo severe and frequent punishments.

Thus of the 15,000 men who, enticed by the promise of an improvement of their lot, had agreed to join the Ukrainian units, one could only rely with difficulty on 3000 (the Chevtchenko regiment and the *Sitch*) who had been really affected by the propaganda. At this period the number of Russian prisoners exceeded 3,000,000, of whom at least 700,000 were Ukrainians, which confirms the absolute failure of this movement.

It would be interesting to remember that from the Russian side the same policy was inaugurated with respect to the prisoners of war of Czech, Slovak, Slovene, Croatian, etc., origin. This move enabled one to establish whole divisions composed of Slavonic minorities. From the beginning of the war Austro-Hungarian military units formed of Slavs, and especially of Czechs, went over to the Russians with their officers, arms, and baggage. Not a single similar case occurred in the Russian Army, which included many entirely Ukrainian regiments. On the contrary, according to the evidence of high Russian and German officers, the Ukrainian regiments were among the best troops, often used as shock units, the most famous of which was the 'Iron Brigade' commanded by General Denikine, future commander of the White Army.

To sum up, the political movements of autonomy and of Ukrainian separatism gave no tangible results despite a subsidized propaganda having the support of such powerful organisms as the central empires.

even harder pressure was applied against the Ukrainian townsmen. 175
In those times the conversion of an Orthodox Ukrainian to Catholicism meant Polonisation. Since the end of the 16th century a large number of the Ukrainian nobility having accepted Catholicism left their Ukrainian nationality. The same pressure led to the Polonisation of a great part of the Ukrainian townsmen.

The neighbourhood of the Tartars was an obstacle to the normal development of Ukraine.

On the territory between Kiev and the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov the stubborn struggle of the Ukrainian nation against the Tartars was carried on for centuries. The Tartars captured people from Ukraine and sold them into slavery in the oriental markets. The last invasion of the Crimean Horde into Ukraine was in 1769.

In spite of this permanent danger from the steppe and under these extremely difficult conditions the Ukrainian nation did not abandon its cultural activity.

Schools, literature, printing, developed in Ukraine. The learned [212]
Arab Paul of Aleppo, who visited Ukraine in 1654, wrote in his memoirs that education was common among the Ukrainian people, and that even the Ukrainian women were literate. Academies had also been founded in Ukraine, and were the models and sources of education for all Greek-Orthodox Slav peoples. Ukrainians studied at the Universities of Italy, France, Germany and other countries.

Against the Tartar hordes, the Ukrainians created an organisa- [701] ●
tion of its own — the Cossack Army. From the middle of the 16th century, the centre of the Ukrainian Cossack Army was in the fortress 'Sich', southward of the Dnieper Cataracts. From this the name of 'Zaporovian Army' arose ('porohy' are the rocks in the Dnieper). The Zaporovian Army performed great deeds in fighting the Tartars. The Ukrainian Cossacks under the leadership of Petro Sahaydachny saved Poland from a terrible Turkish force in the battle of Khotin (Bessarabia), in 1621.

When in 1683 Central Europe was threatened by the Turks, the Ukrainian Cossacks were the force without which the Polish King Jan Sobieski could not dare to begin the decisive battle against the Turks before Vienna.

After the Union of Lublin of 1569, the Polish nobles wanted to take possession of the territory the Ukrainian people had defended against the Tartars. The Polish Government planned to abolish the Ukrainian Cossack Army, and to make the Cossacks serfs of the nobility. The nobility wished to lay their hands on the free peasants of Eastern Ukraine who had not known serfdom. The relations between the Polish Government and the masses of the Ukrainian

[Ukrainian constitution as of Nov. 21, 1949]



[42] Art. 14. The Ukrainian SSR reserves the right freely to secede from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Art. 15. The territory of the Ukrainian SSR may not be altered without its consent.

[107] Art. 15a. The Ukrainian SSR has its own Republican military formations.

[148] Art. 15b. The Ukrainian SSR has the right to enter into direct relations with foreign states and to conclude agreements and exchange diplomatic and consular representatives with them.

Art. 16. The laws of the USSR are binding within the territory of the Ukrainian SSR.

[141] Art. 17. Every citizen of the Ukrainian SSR is a citizen of the USSR. Citizens of all other Union Republics enjoy on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR equal rights with citizens of the Ukrainian SSR.

[63] Art. 18. The Ukrainian SSR consists of the Vinnitsa, Volhynia, Voroshilovgrad, Dniepropetrovsk, Drohobych, Zhitomir, Transcarpathian, Zaporozhye, Izmail, Kamenets-Podolsk, Kiev, Kirovograd, Lvov, Nikolayev, Odessa, Poltava, Rovno, Stalino, Stanislav, Sumi, Ternopol, Kharkov, Kherson, Chernigov and Chernovitsi Regions.

Art. 19. The jurisdiction of the Ukrainian SSR, as represented by its higher organs of state power and organs of state administration, embraces:

a) Adoption of the Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR and control over its observance;

b) Submission of the formation of new regions constituting part of the Ukrainian SSR to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR for confirmation;

c) Establishment of the boundaries, and of the division into districts, of regions;

d) Legislation of the Ukrainian SSR;

e) Maintenance of public order and safeguarding the rights of citizens;

f) Approval of the national-economic plan of the Ukrainian SSR;

g) Approval of the state budget of the Ukrainian SSR and of the report on its fulfilment;

h) Determination of state and local taxes, imposts and non-tax revenues in conformity with the laws of the USSR;

i) Direction of the fulfilment of the local budgets of the regions;

j) Direction of insurance and savings;

k) Administration of the banks, industrial, agricultural and trading enterprises and organizations subordinate to the Republic, as well as direction of local industry;

l) Control and superintendence of the condition and administration of enterprises subordinate to the Union;

m) Establishment of the procedure governing the use of land, mineral wealth, forests and waters;

n) Direction of dwelling houses and the municipal economy, dwelling house construction and the modernization of cities and other inhabited places;

o) Road building; direction of local transport and communications;

p) Labour legislation;

q) Direction of social maintenance;

r) Direction of elementary, secondary and higher education;